Hurricane Beryl 2024: Lessons for Small-Island Emergency Managers

What happened

Beryl formed east of Barbados on June 28, 2024 and strengthened rapidly. The U.S. National Hurricane Center (NHC) estimates that its eye crossed Carriacou, the largest of Grenada’s sister islands, at 1520 UTC on July 1 with maximum sustained winds near 120 knots (about 140 mph), Category 4. It reached 145 knots early on July 2, the earliest Category 5 hurricane on record in the Atlantic, then weakened and passed 15 to 20 nautical miles south of Jamaica on July 3 on its way to Mexico and Texas (NHC Tropical Cyclone Report).

The warning system worked. The NHC reports that Grenada, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Jamaica all issued hurricane watches 48 hours and warnings 39 hours before the storm arrived (NHC Tropical Cyclone Report). What follows is about what came after the warning: assessment, access, relief logistics and reconnecting small islands.

The post-disaster needs assessments (PDNAs) count damage and losses; the World Bank’s earlier GRADE estimates count physical damage only. This explainer covers the three CDEMA states hit hardest and is part of ISPI’s emergency management and resilience hub and ports and maritime security hub.

CDEMA and Comprehensive Disaster Management, briefly

The Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) is the regional intergovernmental disaster agency of the Caribbean Community. It was set up in 1991 as the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDERA), with responsibility for coordinating emergency response and relief for member states that need it, and it became CDEMA in 2009 to take on the wider practice of Comprehensive Disaster Management. It now has 20 Participating States (CDEMA).

Comprehensive Disaster Management (CDM) is CDEMA’s organizing idea. CDEMA defines it as managing all hazards through every phase of the disaster cycle, from prevention and mitigation through preparedness, response, recovery and rehabilitation, by everyone in hazard-prone areas: the public and private sectors, civil society and the general population. The CDM Strategy for 2014 to 2024 set four priority areas: institutional strengthening, knowledge management for evidence-based decisions, mainstreaming CDM in key sectors, and building disaster resilience (CDEMA, CDM).

For response, CDEMA runs the Regional Response Mechanism (RRM), the network of states and partners through which outside help to an affected state is coordinated. It is divided into four sub-regions, North-western, Eastern, Central and Southern, to allow better coordination (CDEMA, RRM). In Beryl, the RRM supplied three kinds of teams: Rapid Needs Assessment Teams to scope the damage, CARICOM Operational Support Teams to reinforce national emergency operations centers, and CARICOM Disaster Relief Units for relief and logistics work on the ground (CDEMA Situation Report 6, July 11, 2024).

By July 4, CDEMA reported that the impact on Grenada and St. Vincent and the Grenadines had triggered a level 2 RRM response (CDEMA Situation Report 3, July 4, 2024). By July 11, the Regional Security System had a 58-member security team in the two countries and was flying responders and supplies between islands, with deployments supported by the Caribbean Development Bank, the United Kingdom and Canada (CDEMA Situation Report 6, July 11, 2024). By early August, CDEMA had a 24-person relief unit in Grenada, 23 of them on Carriacou, and 18 people in St. Vincent and the Grenadines (CDEMA Situation Report 7, Aug. 5, 2024). ISPI’s explainer on island emergency management sets out why such arrangements matter more for islands.

Grenada: Carriacou and Petite Martinique

The NHC reports that the Meteorological Service of Grenada found 99 percent of buildings on Carriacou damaged or destroyed, along with 70 percent of buildings on Petite Martinique, including Carriacou’s only hospital (NHC Tropical Cyclone Report). Grenada’s PDNA counted 3,736 dwellings affected, 2,754 of them on Carriacou, and housing made up about 78 percent of total damage (Grenada PDNA).

Access was the first problem. CDEMA’s July 4 report records that communications with Carriacou and Petite Martinique were lost and that a team from Grenada’s National Disaster Management Agency (NaDMA) reached them on July 2. Carriacou’s airstrip could take aircraft, but its terminal was destroyed and it had no communications. Five of six medical facilities were damaged (CDEMA Situation Report 3, July 4, 2024). By July 11, limited phone service had returned to the sister islands and satellite internet service had been set up (CDEMA Situation Report 6, July 11, 2024).

The sea link held. The same July 4 report says Carriacou’s seaport was working, boats could load and unload, and the ferry service with mainland Grenada had resumed (CDEMA Situation Report 3, July 4, 2024). The PDNA explains why: the cargo terminal at St. George’s had no structural damage, and the quay at Tyrrel Bay on Carriacou was undamaged. The Tyrrel Bay passenger terminal, however, failed catastrophically and had to be demolished and rebuilt, and roof and door damage kept the cargo shed from taking regular cargo for a time (Grenada PDNA).

Lauriston Airport on Carriacou lost its terminal roof, had 60 percent of its perimeter fence severely damaged and lost its air traffic communications antennas. The PDNA also lists the airport’s X-ray machine and walk-through metal detector as water-damaged, and it notes that a plan to start night landings, expected in November 2024, was delayed by about six months (Grenada PDNA).

On July 4, Grenada’s Cabinet ruled that through July 31 relief items should be addressed to NaDMA, that goods sent to others would be treated as normal imports, and that relief vessels should use Port St. George’s as their first port of entry (CDEMA Situation Report 3, July 4, 2024). That gave the government one channel for donations when its sister islands could least absorb them.

The World Bank’s rapid GRADE estimate, as of Aug. 1, 2024, put physical damage at US$218 million, about 16.5 percent of Grenada’s 2023 GDP, 82 percent of it (outside agriculture) on Carriacou and Petite Martinique (World Bank GRADE, Grenada).

St. Vincent and the Grenadines: Union Island, Canouan and Mayreau

The NHC reports that 80 to 90 percent of homes on Canouan, Mayreau and Union Island were damaged or destroyed. It also records that a ferry with five crew members went missing during the hurricane (NHC Tropical Cyclone Report). CDEMA’s assessment team described Union Island as 98 percent devastated and Mayreau as 98 percent damaged. About 700 people were evacuated from Union Island, and on Mayreau there were no vehicles to move relief supplies (CDEMA Situation Report 3, July 4, 2024).

Transport was the second-largest category of damage after housing. The PDNA puts transport damage at XCD71 million (US$26.3 million). Airports accounted for 82 percent of it, with control towers, terminals and perimeter fences damaged, especially on Union Island and Canouan. Wooden jetties on Union Island and Mayreau were destroyed (SVG PDNA, Vol. A). On Union Island, CDEMA reported that the runway remained usable but the tower was destroyed and the terminal badly damaged (CDEMA Situation Report 3, July 4, 2024).

Water and power took longest. Most homes in the Grenadines depend on rooftop rainwater. The PDNA estimates that about 95 percent of roofs and household water systems on Union Island and Mayreau were destroyed, and it says Union Island’s power infrastructure suffered nearly 100 percent destruction (SVG PDNA, Vol. A). At the end of July, CDEMA reported water being trucked to Union Island, generators as the only power on Mayreau and a catamaran chartered with the World Food Programme carrying people and goods between islands. There were 1,333 people in 72 shelters, 21 of them schools, and officials listed evacuation as a major concern for any future storm (CDEMA Situation Report 7, Aug. 5, 2024).

The World Bank’s GRADE estimate put physical damage at US$230.6 million, about 22 percent of 2023 GDP. It found the southern Grenadines accounted for 81 percent of national damage, with Union Island the worst hit (World Bank GRADE, SVG).

Jamaica: a near miss with national reach

Beryl’s center stayed offshore, but the NHC reports hurricane conditions brushing parts of the south coast and rainfall of 8 to 12 inches across much of the island (NHC Tropical Cyclone Report). The Planning Institute of Jamaica’s final PDNA, dated December 2024, puts damage and loss at J$56.7 billion, or 1.9 percent of 2023 GDP. It counts 618,496 people across 119 communities directly affected, 590 damaged roads with restoration costs of J$11.8 billion, and more than 450,000 electricity customers without power at the peak. It also notes that theft and vandalism delayed telecommunications repairs. The Prime Minister declared the whole island a disaster area (PIOJ, Jamaica PDNA).

Jamaica’s ports came through well. PIOJ reports that port damage was minimal and that most ports reopened on July 4, the day after the storm. The exception was the alumina port at Rocky Point in Clarendon, where damage stopped the conveyor system and ship loading; the port had resumed shipments by Sept. 17. The operator reported a restoration cost of about US$10 million, including a more resilient dock (PIOJ, Jamaica PDNA). The airports closed on the night of July 2 and reopened on July 4 and 5 with little damage (PIOJ, Jamaica PDNA). ISPI covers Jamaica’s policing and community safety research on its Jamaica region page.

Ports, airports, ferries and supply chains: what the recovery showed

Across the three countries, the main gateways recovered fast and the spokes did not. The record shows four patterns.

• The hub survived; the last mile broke. St. George’s cargo terminal, the mainland St. Vincent seaport and Jamaica’s main ports were working within days, while the facilities small islands depend on, such as ferry terminals, wooden jetties and airport towers, failed (Grenada PDNA; CDEMA Situation Report 6, July 11, 2024; PIOJ, Jamaica PDNA; SVG PDNA, Vol. A). This is what ISPI calls supply chain singularity, one level down: a sister island depends on its main island as completely as the main island depends on the outside world.
• Relief moved through a regional hub. The CDEMA and World Food Programme logistics group ran a relief transshipment hub from Shed 1 of the Barbados port, alongside a Surface Marketplace and an information management logistics system for tracking supplies (CDEMA Situation Report 6, July 11, 2024). Grenada directed relief vessels to one port of entry (CDEMA Situation Report 3, July 4, 2024).
• Mutual aid filled skill gaps. Through the Caribbean Electric Utility Services Corporation (CARILEC), utility crews from Saint Lucia, Barbados and Dominica were arriving in Grenada by mid-July (CDEMA Situation Report 6, July 11, 2024). CDEMA’s emergency telecommunications team gave responders satellite internet, radio links and solar power on St. Vincent, Union Island, Canouan and Carriacou (CDEMA Situation Report 7, Aug. 5, 2024).
• Pre-arranged money arrived early. CCRIF, the regional parametric insurer, announced payouts to Grenada of about US$44 million on July 9, including the largest single payout in its history, and says its cover pays within 14 days of a triggering event (CCRIF, July 9, 2024). St. Vincent and the Grenadines received about US$1.86 million (CCRIF event briefing, July 11, 2024). Jamaica received US$26.9 million from CCRIF, but its catastrophe bond did not pay because the storm’s pressure never reached the trigger level (PIOJ, Jamaica PDNA).

For port planners, this matches ISPI’s explainer on Honolulu Harbor and the single-port state: an island served by one small harbor depends on reopening that harbor before anything else can move. Beryl shows the same holds for airstrips, ferry terminals and the vessels that link sister islands.

What this means for island and coastal governments

Beryl was well forecast and well warned. The gaps showed up after landfall, on the smallest islands. Seven lessons apply well beyond the Caribbean, including to Hawaiʻi and the Pacific:

• Plan recovery island by island, smallest first. Carriacou, Petite Martinique, Union Island and Mayreau each depended on one jetty or terminal and one airstrip. ISPI’s Honolulu Harbor explainer shows the same dependence on Lānaʻi after Hurricane Lowell, and outer islands across the Pacific share it. Each needs its own restoration plan for harbor, airstrip, power and water.
• Assume communications will fail. Grenada lost contact with its sister islands after landfall, and satellite links filled the gap. Emergency operations centers should hold satellite terminals and power for them before the season starts.
• Treat rooftop water as critical infrastructure. When roofs go, rainwater catchment goes with them. Catchment-dependent communities need water stocks, a trucking and desalination plan, and a timeline measured in months.
• Decide relief logistics in advance. A single port of entry and consignee for relief, a regional transshipment hub and a register of vessels able to serve small jetties can all be written into plans before a storm.
• Include airport security and access control in recovery. Lauriston’s X-ray machine and metal detector were water-damaged and 60 percent of its perimeter fence was severely damaged. Reopening an airport safely needs working screening, intact fencing and controlled access, especially once relief cargo, fuel and cash start arriving.
• Know your mutual aid partners and pre-arranged finance. CDEMA’s RRM, CARILEC’s utility crews and CCRIF’s payouts worked because the agreements existed before the storm. Pacific governments can test their own regional arrangements and the insurance and contingent credit they actually hold.
• Plan for long shelter stays. St. Vincent and the Grenadines still had 21 schools in use as shelters at the end of July 2024. Shelter plans should name other buildings for stays that last months.

For Hawaiʻi, read this alongside ISPI’s review of the Hurricane Lala response and our analysis of Hawaiʻi’s grid after Hurricane Lala. For planning, see PB-11 on hurricane season in the Pacific, WP-03, ISPI’s island emergency management framework, the continuity of operations guide for island local government, the Cyber Continuity Checklist and our tsunami preparedness guide. For the regional picture, see the Biketawa Declaration explainer, the maritime chokepoints explainer and our explainer on small island developing states.

Frequently asked questions

What was Hurricane Beryl?

Hurricane Beryl was a 2024 Atlantic hurricane that became the earliest Category 5 hurricane on record in the Atlantic basin. It made landfall on Carriacou, Grenada, on July 1, 2024 as a Category 4 storm and passed just south of Jamaica on July 3. The National Hurricane Center counts 35 direct deaths along its track.

What is CDEMA?

The Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency is the Caribbean Community’s regional intergovernmental disaster agency. Founded in 1991 as CDERA, it became CDEMA in 2009 and has 20 Participating States.

What is Comprehensive Disaster Management?

CDEMA defines Comprehensive Disaster Management as managing all hazards through all phases of the disaster cycle, from prevention and mitigation to recovery and rehabilitation, by the public and private sectors, civil society and the general population.

How much damage did Hurricane Beryl cause?

The post-disaster needs assessments put damage at about US$173 million in Grenada and about US$241 million in St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The Planning Institute of Jamaica put damage and loss in Jamaica at J$56.7 billion, or 1.9 percent of 2023 GDP.

ISPI publishes its research free under CC BY 4.0. If your government, agency or organization needs a hurricane recovery plan review for outer islands, a port and airport reopening tabletop exercise, or a regional mutual aid assessment, you can commission research from ISPI. ISPI is a nonprofit organization; its application for 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status is pending. Contributions are not tax-deductible until IRS recognition is granted.

Readers following this issue should also see Sri Lanka's Cyclone Ditwah and the Island Emergency Management Gap.

Sources

1. National Hurricane Center, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Beryl (AL022024), 28 June–9 July 2024, by John L. Beven II, Cody Fritz and Laura Alaka, May 1, 2025 (PDF)
2. Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency, About Us
3. Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency, Comprehensive Disaster Management (CDM)
4. Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency, Regional Response Mechanism
5. CDEMA, Hurricane Beryl Situation Report #3, July 4, 2024 (PDF)
6. CDEMA, Hurricane Beryl Situation Report #6, July 11, 2024 (PDF)
7. CDEMA, Hurricane Beryl Situation Report #7, Aug. 5, 2024 (PDF)
8. Government of Grenada with the UN system, World Bank and European Union, Grenada Hurricane Beryl Post-Disaster Needs Assessment Report, Nov. 8, 2024, published by UNDP (PDF)
9. World Bank and GFDRR, Global Rapid Post-Disaster Damage Estimation (GRADE) Report: Hurricane Beryl 2024, Grenada, as of Aug. 1, 2024 (PDF)
10. Government of St. Vincent and the Grenadines with the UN system, World Bank and European Union, Hurricane Beryl Post-Disaster Needs Assessment, Volume A: Summary Report, Jan. 16, 2025, published by UNDP (PDF)
11. World Bank and GFDRR, GRADE Report: Hurricane Beryl 2024, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, as of July 26, 2024 (PDF)
12. Planning Institute of Jamaica, Post-Disaster Needs Assessment of the Impact of Hurricane Beryl on Jamaica, July 3, 2024 (final, December 2024)
13. CCRIF SPC, CCRIF will make payouts to the Government of Grenada of over US$44 million (EC$118 million) following the passage of Hurricane Beryl, July 9, 2024
14. CCRIF SPC, Final event briefing: Tropical Cyclone Beryl, Windward Islands, July 11, 2024 (PDF)
15. ISPI papers: PB-11, WP-03, WP-06
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