Landlocked but Port-Dependent: How Single-Port Reliance Creates Island-Like Risk

The short version

Most island communities depend on one or two ports for nearly everything they import, which makes the harbor a security problem. A landlocked country whose fuel, food and machinery arrive through one foreign seaport and corridor lives with the same risk, except that the port sits in another state’s jurisdiction. This explainer, part of ISPI’s ports and maritime security research hub and the supply chain and infrastructure hub, sets out what UN conference texts, the World Bank’s logistics data and East African port and corridor authorities actually publish about that dependence, and what island and coastal governments can learn from it.

Figures are cited with their date and source; where no primary source gives a share of trade through one port, the dependence is described qualitatively. The World Bank Logistics Performance Index is used only as supporting evidence.

What the UN means by a landlocked developing country

The Vienna Programme of Action for Landlocked Developing Countries for the Decade 2014–2024 opens by describing 32 countries in Africa, Asia, Europe and South America, then home to about 440 million people, that face special challenges tied to their lack of direct territorial access to the sea and their remoteness and isolation from world markets. Their international trade depends on transit through other countries; extra border crossings, long distances, cumbersome transit procedures and inadequate infrastructure raise total transport and transaction costs (Vienna PoA). The programme was adopted at the second UN Conference on Landlocked Developing Countries, held in Vienna from Nov. 3 to 5, 2014, and is annexed to General Assembly resolution 69/137 (A/RES/72/232).

The Vienna text notes that transit neighbors are often developing countries with similar resource limits and their own transit burdens (Vienna PoA), so the gateway port is run by a government with its own pressures.

Its successor carries the same diagnosis into 2034. The UN describes the Awaza Programme of Action for LLDCs for the Decade 2024–2034 as adopted by the General Assembly on Dec. 24, 2024 under resolution A/RES/79/233, drawing on lessons from the Vienna programme and again covering 32 LLDCs (UN Awaza PoA page). The resolution text puts their population at about 570 million and lists the lack of direct territorial access to the sea, obstacles to transport and communication, long distances from major markets, cumbersome transit procedures and inadequate infrastructure among their constraints (A/RES/79/233). The Third UN Conference on LLDCs (LLDC3) concluded in Awaza, Turkmenistan, on Aug. 8, 2025 with the Awaza Political Declaration and the formal endorsement of the programme (UN-OHRLLS, Aug. 8, 2025). The UN plans a midterm review in 2029 and a fourth conference in 2034 (UN Awaza PoA page).

Why landlocked dependence looks like island dependence

ISPI frames island exposure through five conditions, set out in the supply chain singularity framework. Each has a landlocked counterpart in the published record.

• Isolation. The Vienna text names remoteness and isolation from world markets as defining features of LLDCs, alongside the absence of a coast (Vienna PoA).
• Single points of failure. When one port and one corridor carry most of a country’s sea trade, a closure at the terminal, a washed-out bridge or a border shutdown has no easy substitute. The Key Bridge and Port of Baltimore closure case shows how one allision closed a major U.S. port; a landlocked state that depends on one gateway faces the same exposure without owning the port.
• Import dependence. The Awaza text records that LLDCs held only 1.1 per cent of global merchandise exports in 2022 and that agriculture still accounts on average for 17 per cent of their GDP and about 55 per cent of employment (A/RES/79/233).
• Maritime exposure. A landlocked country cannot see the sea, but it feels shipping shocks through its gateway port. In April 2026 Djibouti’s port authority reported a cargo surge linked to the Persian Gulf maritime security crisis (DPFZA, Apr. 12, 2026). The analysis of Red Sea diversions and island import costs and the maritime chokepoints explainer trace how those route shocks reach islands; they reach landlocked importers through the same ports.
• Insider threat at nodes. Every border post, depot and terminal is a place where staff with access can divert cargo or demand payments. The Northern Corridor’s own history records cargo diversion risk, checkpoint harassment and pipeline fuel theft (NCTTCA Handbook 2026). ISPI’s PB-07 brief on supply chain insider risk at island ports describes the same pattern at island ports.

The structural difference is jurisdiction: a landlocked government relies on a port it does not regulate and roads it does not police. UNCLOS Part X gives land-locked States a right of access to and from the sea and freedom of transit through transit States by all means of transport, but leaves the terms to bilateral or regional agreements and preserves the transit State’s legitimate interests (UNCLOS Part X).

What the law and the programmes actually promise

UNCLOS Part X is short and practical. Article 125 sets the right of access and freedom of transit; Article 127 bars duties on traffic in transit other than charges for specific services; Article 129 lets the two sides cooperate on port installations and equipment; Article 130 requires transit States to take appropriate measures to avoid delays; and Article 131 gives ships of land-locked States equal treatment in maritime ports (UNCLOS Part X).

The Vienna programme turned those principles into corridor targets. Its first priority, fundamental transit policy issues, set specific objectives to cut travel time along corridors so that transit cargo could move 300 to 400 kilometres every 24 hours, to reduce time at land borders significantly and to improve intermodal transfers between port, rail and road (Vienna PoA).

The Awaza programme reaffirms access to and from the sea on the basis of freedom of transit, describes transport corridors as an effective tool for easing trade bottlenecks, and calls for climate-resilient transit routes, smart one-stop border posts and interoperable transit systems (A/RES/79/233). It also records concern from LLDCs that little progress has been made in implementing UNCLOS Part X and the transit provisions of GATT Article V and the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement. Among its targets are resilient, safe and smart transit infrastructure and a high-level panel of experts to identify ways to ensure seamless LLDC access to and from the sea (A/RES/79/233).

What the published numbers show about cost and delay

The Vienna programme cites World Bank Doing Business 2014 data: LLDCs took an estimated 47 days to import goods in 2014, down from 57 days in 2006, and 42 days to export, down from 49, still almost twice the time taken by transit countries. The average cost of exporting a container was estimated at $3,204 for LLDCs against $1,268 for transit countries, and $3,884 against $1,434 for importing one (Vienna PoA). The same text estimates that development in LLDCs is on average 20 per cent lower than it would be if they were not landlocked (Vienna PoA).

A decade later, the Awaza resolution estimates that trade costs are 30 per cent higher for landlocked than for coastal developing countries, partly because goods cross more borders. It also notes that as of November 2023 LLDCs had implemented 61.8 per cent of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, against 81.1 per cent for all developing countries (A/RES/79/233). The Awaza text concludes that progress under Vienna fell short of its goals, while noting some corridors improved travel times (A/RES/79/233).

The World Bank’s 2023 Logistics Performance Index report adds tracking data. It finds that LLDCs are more logistically constrained than their coastal neighbors and that, on average, containers wait substantially longer at the same port of entry when bound for a landlocked country than when bound for the coastal transit country (World Bank LPI 2023). It identifies three delays: longer port dwell, partly because transit ports often allow longer free time for such cargo; corridor delays, longest for Nepal and Mali (over a week) and much shorter in East and Southern Africa; and dwell inland, including at destination (World Bank LPI 2023).

Container dwell times for selected landlocked countries, 2022 (days; World Bank calculations from TradeLens data)

Country	Port dwell time at entry port	Reference dwell time for transit country	Inland and destination dwell time	Corridor dwell time
Ethiopia	10.9	8.9	0.2	not available
Uganda	9.3	5.1	8.8	4.4
Rwanda	14.6	5.1	2.0	not available
Burundi	11.9	10.3	3.3	not available
Malawi	10.6	7.4	2.1	6.5
Nepal	6.1	2.6	5.5	9.2
Mongolia	25.0	5.5	0.1	not available

In 2022, containers for Rwanda averaged 14.6 days of port dwell against a 5.1-day transit-country reference (World Bank LPI 2023). These are calculations from one tracking dataset for one year, not a measure of total trade, and the report itself cautions that such data are less representative for EU countries, where direct trucking is favored (World Bank LPI 2023).

LPI scores tell a complementary story. The 2023 edition scores 139 countries, with a confidence interval and grouped rank for each (World Bank LPI 2023); several landlocked and small island economies sit in the same band. Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda do not appear in the 2023 scored table, so ISPI cites no LPI score for them.

World Bank 2023 LPI: landlocked countries next to island and gateway economies

Economy	2023 LPI score (lower–upper bound)	Grouped rank of 139
Singapore	4.3 (4.2–4.4)	1
Botswana (landlocked)	3.1 (2.6–3.6)	57
Rwanda (landlocked)	2.8 (2.5–3.1)	73
Solomon Islands (island)	2.8 (2.4–3.2)	73
Djibouti (transit gateway)	2.7 (2.5–2.9)	79
Paraguay (landlocked)	2.7 (2.5–2.9)	79
Mali (landlocked)	2.6 (2.1–3.1)	88
Mongolia (landlocked)	2.5 (2.2–2.8)	97
Jamaica (island)	2.5 (2.3–2.7)	97
Fiji (island)	2.3 (2.0–2.6)	123

The report makes the island link itself: countries with limited connections, such as small island states, depend on transshipment to reach major markets, and across all countries only about 44 per cent of containers move port-to-port without transshipment (World Bank LPI 2023). Small maritime economies, it adds, rely on a few hubs that can charge markups (World Bank LPI 2023). That is the landlocked problem translated to water: one or two gateways, set by someone else.

Case 1: Ethiopia and the Djibouti gateway

Djibouti’s Ports and Free Zones Authority (DPFZA) describes the Doraleh Container Terminal, operated by SGTD and launched in 2009, as playing a dual role: the main gateway to Ethiopia and a relay transshipment hub serving neighboring ports (DPFZA, SGTD). The terminal lists a 1.8 million TEU capacity, an on-dock rail station, independent power and water plants, and ISO 28000 among its certifications (DPFZA, SGTD).

The Doraleh Multipurpose Port, inaugurated in May 2017 to relieve congestion, has a direct connection to the Djibouti–Addis Ababa railway; DPFZA says discharge waiting time fell from weeks to days within a year (DPFZA, DMP). On land, the Djibouti Ports Corridor Road company, jointly owned by DPFZA and the Djibouti Road Agency, maintains a 567-kilometre road network linking the ports to neighboring countries (DPFZA, DPCR).

The gateway’s exposure shows in DPFZA’s own news. On April 12, 2026 it reported a coordination meeting led by Djibouti’s ministers of infrastructure and of economy and finance, with port, freight-forwarder and trucking leaders, on improving the efficiency of the Djibouti–Ethiopia corridor by road and rail. The same meeting addressed the maritime security crisis and a resulting surge of cargo toward Djibouti; DMP had just received a roll-on/roll-off vessel diverted from the Persian Gulf that discharged 2,000 vehicles, which DPFZA said included 1,527 units originally bound for Jebel Ali for later transshipment (DPFZA, Apr. 12, 2026).

The gateway is a strength and a dependency at once: modern and rail-linked, but diverted cargo, regional shocks and congestion compete for the same berths and rail slots that carry a landlocked neighbor’s imports. ISPI did not find a primary source giving a current share of Ethiopia’s trade through Djibouti, so this explainer gives no percentage; the operator’s description of Doraleh as Ethiopia’s main gateway is the published basis.

Case 2: the Northern Corridor and the Port of Mombasa

The Northern Corridor Transit and Transport Coordination Authority (NCTTCA) describes the corridor as a multimodal trade route linking the landlocked Great Lakes countries with the Kenyan seaport of Mombasa. The Northern Corridor Transit and Transport Agreement was signed in 1985 and revised in 2007 by Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda; South Sudan acceded in 2012. Its protocols run from maritime port facilities and customs to rail, road, pipelines and dangerous goods (NCTTCA).

The handbook gives the corridor’s performance record as NCTTCA tells it. Mombasa–Kampala transit times that stretched to two or three weeks in the 1990s now average about four to six days (a later chapter gives four to five days); container dwell at Mombasa fell from around eleven days in 2012 to three or four days; and clearance at the Busia and Malaba border posts fell from nearly two days to often under six hours (NCTTCA Handbook 2026). It credits border posts, customs integration, the 2014 Mombasa Port Community Charter and the Standard Gauge Railway (NCTTCA Handbook 2026).

Two port-dependent corridors in East Africa (sources: DPFZA terminal, port, road and Apr. 12, 2026 pages; NCTTCA Who We Are and 2026 Handbook)

Item	Djibouti–Ethiopia corridor	Northern Corridor (Mombasa)
Gateway described by its operator or authority	Doraleh Container Terminal (SGTD): main gateway to Ethiopia and a transshipment hub	Port of Mombasa, linking the landlocked Great Lakes countries to the sea
Landlocked users named by the source	Ethiopia	Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, South Sudan and eastern DRC
Inland links	Direct connection from Doraleh Multipurpose Port to the Djibouti–Addis Ababa railway; 567 km corridor road network	Standard Gauge Railway for the first ~500 km to Naivasha inland depot by 2025, then road; Kenya pipeline network
Gateway capacity or throughput	SGTD handling capacity 1.8 million TEU; DMP 1,200 m quay, 6 berths	2.11 million TEU handled in 2025, up 5.5% on 2024 (handbook citing KPA); about 580,000 TEU annual transit volume estimated
Security-relevant features in the source	Terminal lists ISO 28000 supply-chain security certification among its standards	Regional Electronic Cargo Tracking System since 2017 to reduce diversion risk; pipeline fuel theft and vandalism listed as persistent risks

The same handbook shows the dependence. It reports, citing Kenya Ports Authority sources, that Mombasa handled 2.11 million TEU in 2025, a 5.5 per cent rise on 2024, and estimates annual transit volume at about 580,000 TEU, with Uganda the largest corridor user (NCTTCA Handbook 2026). A UN Economic Commission for Africa message in the handbook observes that corridor disruptions immediately affect the region’s economic activity (NCTTCA Handbook 2026). The handbook also notes that Rwanda and Burundi have historically balanced Mombasa against the Central Corridor through Dar es Salaam, and that Tanzania’s upgrades at Dar es Salaam and Tanga now compete for fuel flows (NCTTCA Handbook 2026).

Security problems appear in the record too. NCTTCA credits the Regional Electronic Cargo Tracking System, launched in 2017 and initially linking Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda, with reducing diversion risk, and says trucks once faced up to 30 roadblocks on the Mombasa–Kampala road before monitoring cut delays, costs and harassment (NCTTCA Handbook 2026). On the fuel side, it lists fuel theft and vandalism as persistent risks along isolated pipeline segments (NCTTCA Handbook 2026). Those are insider and node-integrity problems of the kind the Fiji port inside-threat case and the WP-06 paper on supply chain security and community resilience describe for island ports.

What this means for island and coastal governments

Landlocked developing countries show that island-like risk is about dependence on a single gateway, not about water. Many island economies also rely on a foreign transshipment hub they do not control, which is the landlocked problem at sea (World Bank LPI 2023); Hawaiʻi’s dependence on one harbor, set out in the Honolulu Harbor single-port state explainer, and the hub-and-spoke shipping in the disaster-vulnerability primer on supply chain singularity follow the same logic. Five practical lessons follow:

• Map the whole lifeline, not just the harbor. Treat the gateway port, transshipment hub, onward link and fuel terminal as one system, as corridor authorities do (NCTTCA; supply chain singularity framework).
• Measure the lifeline every year. NCTTCA tracks transit and dwell trends through its transport observatory, and the World Bank benchmarks landlocked port dwell against the transit country (NCTTCA Handbook 2026; World Bank LPI 2023). Island port authorities can publish the same few indicators.
• Name an alternate gateway before you need it. Rwanda and Burundi’s historical use of both Mombasa and Dar es Salaam, as NCTTCA’s handbook describes it, is a working example of route redundancy (NCTTCA Handbook 2026). Islands with a second harbor or airfield should test it under load, not just list it.
• Put access and delay into written agreements. UNCLOS Part X and the Awaza Programme of Action treat transit access, delay avoidance and equal port treatment as obligations and targets (UNCLOS Part X; A/RES/79/233). Islands that rely on foreign hubs or carriers can seek comparable service and priority clauses for disaster cargo.
• Watch maritime shocks far from home. Djibouti’s April 2026 Gulf-diversion surge shows route shocks landing on a shared gateway (DPFZA, Apr. 12, 2026); see the maritime chokepoints explainer.
• Treat node staff as part of the security perimeter. Cargo diversion, checkpoint extortion and fuel theft are recorded corridor risks (NCTTCA Handbook 2026). Vetting, tracking and supervision at terminals, depots and border posts are the controls ISPI recommends in PB-07 brief on supply chain insider risk at island ports.

Neither the UN nor the corridor authorities claim the problem is solved; the Awaza text says Vienna’s targets were not met, and NCTTCA still lists road strain, pipeline risk and financing gaps (A/RES/79/233; NCTTCA Handbook 2026). A single gateway is a standing risk to measure, contract for and guard every year.

Frequently asked questions

What is a landlocked developing country?

The UN uses the term for 32 developing countries in Africa, Asia, Europe and South America with no direct territorial access to the sea. Their sea trade depends on transit through neighboring countries, which raises transport costs and delays.

What is the Awaza Programme of Action?

It is the UN Programme of Action for Landlocked Developing Countries for 2024–2034, adopted by the General Assembly on Dec. 24, 2024 (resolution 79/233) and endorsed at the third LLDC conference in Awaza, Turkmenistan, which concluded on Aug. 8, 2025. It succeeds the Vienna Programme of Action (2014–2024).

Why is single-port reliance risky for a landlocked country?

If one foreign port and one corridor carry most sea trade, a port closure, border shutdown, route shock or corruption at a node can halt imports, and the landlocked state does not control the port. World Bank 2023 LPI data show landlocked cargo waiting longer at the same gateway port than coastal cargo.

Which ports serve Ethiopia and the Great Lakes countries?

Djibouti’s port authority describes the Doraleh container terminal as Ethiopia’s main gateway, linked by rail and road. The Northern Corridor links Kenya’s Port of Mombasa to Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, South Sudan and eastern DRC, with Dar es Salaam as an alternative route for some users.

What can island governments learn from landlocked countries?

Treat the gateway port, transshipment hub, inland or interisland link and their staff as one lifeline; measure dwell and transit times; name and test an alternate gateway; write access and priority into agreements; and control insider risk at every node.

ISPI publishes its research free under CC BY 4.0. If your government, port authority or supply-chain team needs a single-gateway dependence review, a port-and-corridor lifeline tabletop or an insider-risk assessment for cargo nodes, you can commission research from ISPI. ISPI is a nonprofit organization with its 501(c)(3) application pending.

Sources

1. Vienna Programme of Action for LLDCs for the Decade 2014–2024 (UN-OHRLLS)
2. UN General Assembly resolution 72/232
3. UN, Awaza Programme of Action for LLDCs 2024–2034
4. UN General Assembly resolution 79/233 (Programme of Action for LLDCs 2024–2034)
5. UN-OHRLLS, LLDC3 closing release (Aug. 8, 2025)
6. UNCLOS Part X
7. World Bank, Connecting to Compete 2023 (LPI)
8. DPFZA, Doraleh Container Terminal (SGTD)
9. DPFZA, Doraleh Multipurpose Port
10. DPFZA, Djibouti Ports Corridor Road
11. DPFZA, corridor coordination meeting (Apr. 12, 2026)
12. NCTTCA, Who We Are
13. NCTTCA, Northern Corridor at 40 Handbook (2026)
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