Policy brief on insider threat vulnerabilities in island port operations and maritime supply chain security.
Policy brief on insider threat vulnerabilities in island port operations and maritime supply chain security. Free under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 — no registration required.
Summary of the paper
"Supply Chain Insider Risk in Island Ports" is an ISPI policy brief on insider threat in the small, close-knit workforces that run Hawaii's commercial ports and those of the Pacific Island territories and Caribbean islands.
The brief argues that island port workforces, often multigenerational and connected by family ties, suppress insider threat reporting, and that the main risks run through cargo handling rather than physical access. Detection therefore needs to be built around cargo flow and documentation patterns, not primarily around access control.
What the paper finds
- Social density suppresses reporting. Multigenerational employment and family connections make colleagues reluctant to report warning signs about people they know well.
- Cargo vectors differ from access vectors. Diversion, contraband concealment and manifest manipulation are structurally different from the access-based threats that standard port security frameworks mainly address.
- Federal programs were built for large organizations. The brief argues that federal insider threat programs do not adequately address small island port workforce dynamics.
What it recommends
- Develop island port-specific insider threat detection frameworks centered on cargo flow anomaly detection.
- Reform CBP insider threat assessment protocols for small island ports to account for workforce social density.
- Fund shared third-party behavioral threat assessment services so small port operators have professional capacity without maintaining it in-house.
Who it's for
Port authorities and harbor operators, stevedoring and logistics firms, CBP and Coast Guard port security staff, and maritime unions in Hawaii and the Pacific.
This research connects to the 39 Small Island Developing States worldwide through the Samoa Pathway and BPOA+30 framework. Every ISPI research product carries a mandatory SIDS global bridge per the ISPI Research Architecture.
Cite as
Pulley, Warren (2026). Supply Chain Insider Risk in Island Ports: When the Port Employee Is Both the Security Officer and the Longshoreman (ISPI PB-07). Island Security Policy Institute, Honolulu. https://ispiglobal.com/papers-landing/pb07-supply-chain-insider-risk https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23449990
BibTeX
@techreport{ispipb072026,
author = {Pulley, Warren},
title = {Supply Chain Insider Risk in Island Ports: When the Port Employee Is Both the Security Officer and the Longshoreman},
institution = {Island Security Policy Institute},
address = {Honolulu, HI},
number = {ISPI PB-07},
year = {2026},
url = {https://ispiglobal.com/papers-landing/pb07-supply-chain-insider-risk},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23449990}
}Related analysis
AnalysisWhy Corporations Operating on Islands Commission Independent Security Research →AnalysisWhat Is Insider Threat in Island Organizations? Why Standard Programs Fail in Small Communities →AnalysisCommunity Policing in Island Communities: Why the Continental Model Requires a Different Framework →PaperPB-06 — Digital Insider Threat in Island Organizations →PaperPB-08 — Insider Threat in Pacific Government Agencies →GuideInsider Threat in Island Communities: Research and FAQ →Pulley, Warren. "Supply Chain Insider Risk at Island Ports." Island Security Policy Institute, 2026. https://ispiglobal.com/papers-landing/pb07-supply-chain-insider-risk
