Undersea Cable Sabotage in the Baltic: Lessons for Pacific Cable Protection

The short version

The Baltic Sea became the world’s test case for undersea infrastructure security between 2023 and 2025. In three separate episodes, pipelines and cables on the seabed between Nordic and Baltic states were damaged, governments convened crisis meetings, navies boarded or shadowed ships, and NATO and the European Union launched new protection programmes (NATO, Jan. 14, 2025; European Commission, Feb. 21, 2025). The incidents are well documented by the authorities and operators involved, which makes them a useful source of lessons for regions with far fewer resources.

The Pacific is one of those regions. ISPI’s explainer on Pacific undersea cables and why islands are exposed sets out why: cables carry most international data, faults are routine, and a single break can isolate a small island state. This piece asks a narrower question. What actually happened in the Baltic, what did governments do about it, what does the law allow, and which of those responses make sense for Pacific island governments and for Hawaiʻi and the U.S. territories?

Two cautions shape what follows. First, attribution is contested. Several governments described the incidents as sabotage or suspected sabotage, other governments have not confirmed intent, and the only court rulings so far concern jurisdiction and alleged neglect of duties, not deliberate attack. ISPI reports each government’s and court’s stated position and does not draw its own conclusion on intent. Second, the Baltic and the Pacific differ in scale. The Baltic is a small, shallow, crowded sea ringed by wealthy states with navies; the Pacific is vast, deep in most places, and served by thin cable networks.

What happened in the Baltic Sea?

October 2023: Balticconnector and two telecom cables

In the early hours of Oct. 8, 2023, the Finnish and Estonian gas transmission operators, Gasgrid Finland and Elering, saw an unusual pressure drop in Balticconnector, the undersea gas pipeline between the two countries. They closed the pipeline’s valves to isolate it (Gasgrid Finland). Elering later said the pipeline had broken because of external damage in Finland’s exclusive economic zone; its undersea section runs about 77 km from Paldiski in Estonia to Inkoo in Finland (Elering, Apr. 4, 2024). The pipeline returned to commercial use on Apr. 22, 2024, after repairs and a phased recommissioning (Gasgrid Finland; Elering, Apr. 4, 2024).

The same week, a telecommunications cable between Estonia and Finland failed. Estonia’s prime minister convened ministers and the intelligence and security services on Oct. 10, 2023, said there was no threat to Estonia’s security of supply, and reported that Finland’s National Bureau of Investigation had opened a criminal investigation into possible sabotage of the pipeline while Estonia investigated the cable (Government of Estonia, Oct. 10, 2023). On Oct. 19, Estonian investigators told the government that results so far indicated the cable damage was manmade, that it was too soon to name a culprit, and that it had not been confirmed that the damage was deliberate. Damage to the Estonia–Sweden cable was folded into the same investigation (Government of Estonia, Oct. 20, 2023).

China’s position is part of the record because a Hong Kong-flagged ship became the focus of reporting. Asked about the Finnish investigation on Oct. 25, 2023, China’s foreign ministry said it was in communication with Finland and others, that the incident was still under investigation, and that it hoped for an objective, fair and professional process (China MFA, Oct. 25, 2023). Asked on Aug. 13, 2024 about reports that Chinese authorities had concluded the damage was an accident caused by a strong storm, the ministry did not confirm those findings; it said its investigation was still ongoing and called for a professional, objective and cooperative investigation (China MFA, Aug. 13, 2024).

November 2024: the C-Lion1 and Sweden–Lithuania cables

On Nov. 17, 2024, a telecommunications cable between Sweden and Lithuania, owned by a Swedish company, was damaged. Several hours later the Finland–Germany cable, which lies to the south of it, was also damaged. Sweden’s prosecutors opened a preliminary investigation, the Swedish Armed Forces carried out the seabed crime scene examinations on behalf of the Coast Guard, and Finland, Sweden and Lithuania set up a joint investigation team (Swedish Prosecution Authority, Nov. 27, 2024).

The Finland–Germany link is C-Lion1, a 1,173 km cable owned by Cinia, a company majority-owned by the Finnish state. Cinia detected the fault at 4:04 a.m. on Nov. 18, 2024, sent the repair ship Cable Vigilance from France, and completed the repair in the Swedish EEZ east of Öland at 9 p.m. Eastern European Time on Nov. 28. It said alternative routes kept disruption to customers minimal and that the cause remained under investigation (Cinia). The foreign ministers of Finland and Germany said on Nov. 18 that they were deeply concerned, that such an incident immediately raises suspicions of intentional damage, and that a thorough investigation was under way; they placed it in the context of hybrid threats to European security (Finnish and German foreign ministers, Nov. 18, 2024).

Christmas Day 2024: Estlink 2 and the Eagle S

On Dec. 25, 2024, Fingrid’s Estlink 2 power link between Finland and Estonia disconnected, as did Elisa’s submarine telecom cables between Helsinki and Tallinn. Two more telecom cables were damaged: Cinia’s Finland–Germany cable between Helsinki and Hanko and a CITIC cable between Helsinki and Tallinn. Finland’s Transport and Communications Agency, Traficom, said traffic was immediately routed to backup connections, so links between Finland and the rest of the world stayed fully functional, and that the incident did not affect Finland’s security of supply (Traficom, Dec. 28, 2024).

Fingrid said the outage cut transmission capacity between the two countries by 650 megawatts but did not affect the functioning of Finland’s power system. Repairs at sea began in May 2025, about one kilometre of cable was replaced, and the link was due back in commercial use on June 20, 2025, nearly six months after the damage (Fingrid, June 18, 2025).

Estonia’s response was explicit. On Dec. 27, 2024, its defence minister and the commander of the Defence Forces agreed that the navy would begin protecting the remaining Estlink 1 cable with patrol ships, starting with the vessel Raju. The minister described the Estlink 2 damage as sabotage while saying the investigation had to establish the details (Estonian Ministry of Defence, Dec. 27, 2024). The foreign minister said the operation was meant to secure energy links and to deter adversaries (Estonian Foreign Ministry, Dec. 27, 2024).

Finland’s criminal case went in a different direction. According to the Helsinki District Court, prosecutors charged the master, first officer and second officer of the tanker Eagle S on the basis that the ship’s anchor fell into the sea and was dragged along the seabed, cutting several cables. The charge did not allege that they intended to damage the cables; it alleged that they knew the anchor windlass was in poor repair and intentionally neglected their duties (Helsinki District Court, Oct. 3, 2025). The Court of Appeal identifies the ship as sailing under the flag of the Cook Islands and the charges as aggravated criminal mischief and aggravated interference with telecommunications (Helsinki Court of Appeal, Aug. 27, 2026).

Was it sabotage? What each government and court has said

There is no single answer in the primary record, and the positions differ by government and by incident. The table above gives the short version. In more detail:

• Estonia called the Estlink 2 damage sabotage and moved warships to guard Estlink 1 (Estonian Ministry of Defence, Dec. 27, 2024). For the October 2023 cable, its investigators said the damage was manmade but intent was unconfirmed (Government of Estonia, Oct. 20, 2023).
• Finland and Germany said the November 2024 C-Lion1 break immediately raised suspicions of intentional damage and pointed to hybrid warfare by malicious actors, without naming a state (Finnish and German foreign ministers, Nov. 18, 2024).
• The eight Baltic Sea NATO allies condemned acts of sabotage against undersea infrastructure in general, said they were ready to attribute hostile actions as appropriate, and described Russia’s so-called shadow fleet as a particular threat to infrastructure and the environment (Baltic Sea NATO Allies Summit statement).
• Finnish prosecutors did not allege intentional damage in the Eagle S case; the charges rest on alleged neglect of duties around a defective anchor windlass (Helsinki District Court, Oct. 3, 2025).
• China said its own investigation into the Balticconnector incident was ongoing as of Aug. 13, 2024, and called for a professional and objective process (China MFA, Aug. 13, 2024).
• Sweden, for the November 2024 cables, released procedural information only: examinations completed, analysis under way, joint investigation team formed (Swedish Prosecution Authority, Nov. 27, 2024).

The operators’ own context is also relevant. The International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) says dragged anchors account for about 30 percent of cable incidents each year, around 60 faults, and that an anchor can deploy without the crew noticing if it is not properly secured. It warns that because only disruptive incidents make the news, coverage can create the impression that such events are rare or suspicious when many are traced to poor seamanship, equipment failure or improper anchor stowage (ICPC). That is not evidence about any Baltic case. It is a reminder that accident, negligence and sabotage can look alike on the seabed, and that investigators need time and evidence to tell them apart.

What did the Eagle S court cases decide?

The case is the first major test of how a coastal state can prosecute a ship crew for damage to cables in its exclusive economic zone. On Oct. 3, 2025, the Helsinki District Court dismissed the charges and the related damages claims because, in its view, Finnish criminal law could not be applied. It found that the conduct took place in international waters within Finland’s EEZ; that the damage did not produce the kind of consequences for Finland’s energy supply or telecommunications required for criminal mischief; that it did cause very serious economic losses in Finland; that the anchor loss resulted from a failure of the anchor securing mechanism; and that the case was therefore an incident of navigation under the Law of the Sea, which left criminal jurisdiction with the flag state or the defendants’ home states (Helsinki District Court, Oct. 3, 2025).

On Aug. 27, 2026, the Helsinki Court of Appeal unanimously overturned that judgment and sent the case back to the District Court. The prosecutor, two cable-owning companies and the ship’s manager (on legal costs) had appealed. The appeal court held that the alleged offences were committed in Finland, where their consequences appeared, so Finnish criminal law applies under the territoriality principle recognized in national and international law. It also held that the core events were not an incident of navigation within the meaning of the Law of the Sea convention, so the convention did not limit Finland’s criminal jurisdiction (Helsinki Court of Appeal, Aug. 27, 2026).

The Court of Appeal said its decision was not final and could be appealed to the Supreme Court if the Supreme Court grants leave (Helsinki Court of Appeal, Aug. 27, 2026). ISPI found no published Supreme Court decision on leave as of Nov. 11, 2026. Whatever the final outcome, the case shows how much turns on a few treaty words, and how long accountability can take: when the appeal court ruled, some 20 months after the cables were cut, no court had yet decided the charges on their merits.

What does the Law of the Sea say about cutting undersea cables?

The core rule is Article 113 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. It requires every state to make it a punishable offence for a ship flying its flag, or a person under its jurisdiction, to break or injure a submarine cable beneath the high seas wilfully or through culpable negligence; the same applies to pipelines and high-voltage power cables, and to conduct likely to cause such damage. There is an exception for people acting to save their lives or ships after taking all necessary precautions (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, official text (articles 58, 79, 97 and 113–115) (PDF)). Article 58 extends this and the other high-seas cable articles to the exclusive economic zone, as far as they fit the EEZ regime (UNCLOS).

The structure matters. Article 113 asks flag states, not the coastal state that lost the cable, to legislate. Article 97 adds that, for a collision or other incident of navigation, penal proceedings against the master or crew may be brought only in the flag state or the state of the person’s nationality, and that only the flag state may order arrest or detention of the ship (UNCLOS). That is why the Eagle S dispute centred on whether dragging an anchor was an incident of navigation. The Baltic Sea allies’ joint statement of Jan. 14, 2025 urged all states to adopt laws making cable and pipeline damage in the high seas or EEZs by their ships or nationals a punishable offence and to prosecute as appropriate (Baltic Sea NATO Allies Summit statement).

Two other articles are about money rather than crime. Article 114 makes cable owners who damage another cable during laying or repair pay for the repair; Article 115 requires cable owners to compensate ship owners who sacrifice an anchor, net or gear to avoid damaging a cable, provided they took reasonable precautions beforehand (UNCLOS). In the Baltic, the operators’ losses are being pursued in court; in Finland, two cable-owning companies were parties to the appeal (Helsinki Court of Appeal, Aug. 27, 2026).

How did NATO, the EU and the cable industry respond?

NATO launched Baltic Sentry on Jan. 14, 2025, at a Helsinki summit of Baltic Sea allies co-hosted by the NATO secretary general, Finland’s president and Estonia’s prime minister. NATO said the activity would involve frigates and maritime patrol aircraft, a small fleet of naval drones and the integration of national surveillance assets, and that it would work with industry through its Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network. The secretary general also said ship captains should understand that threats to infrastructure could lead to boarding, impounding and arrest (NATO, Jan. 14, 2025).

The leaders’ joint statement from the same summit was signed by Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden, in the presence of the NATO secretary general and the European Commission. It activated the Commander Task Force-Baltic in Rostock to coordinate allied ships, committed to more surveillance of suspect vessels, including checks of insurance certificates, and promised tracking tools and further sanctions targeting the shadow fleet. It also said the signatories would act within the law of the sea, including freedom of navigation, and seek accountability and compensation for damage (Baltic Sea NATO Allies Summit statement).

The European Union’s Action Plan on Cable Security, presented on Feb. 21, 2025, groups its measures under prevention, detection, response and recovery, and deterrence. It calls for stronger security requirements and risk assessments, priority funding for new and smart cables to add redundancy, sea-basin threat monitoring, a faster EU crisis framework and more repair capacity, and sanctions and diplomatic measures against hostile actors and the shadow fleet. The Commission said cables carry 99 percent of inter-continental internet traffic and that the Baltic Sea region had seen a significant increase in incidents (European Commission, Feb. 21, 2025).

The global cable community moved in parallel. In November 2024 the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the ICPC formed the International Advisory Body for Submarine Cable Resilience, with 40 members including ministers, regulators and industry executives, from small island states to major economies (ITU, Nov. 29, 2024). Its members page lists the chief executive of Tonga Cable Limited among them (ITU advisory body members). Citing ICPC figures, ITU says there are 150 to 200 cable faults a year worldwide, about three repairs a week, mostly from fishing and anchoring (ITU, Nov. 29, 2024). The body’s Abuja Declaration of Feb. 26, 2025 calls for geographically diverse routes and landings so no region is left isolated, streamlined permits, stockpiles of spares, and training for developing countries to manage and repair cables (Abuja Declaration, Feb. 26, 2025). Its Working Group 1 recommends a single government point of contact for permits, customs and crew clearance for emergency repairs, shared repair vessels and spares, and plans for shallow-water rapid-response teams (advisory body Working Group 1).

Could the same thing happen to Pacific cables?

Physically, yes. Anchors, fishing gear and natural hazards break cables everywhere, and the ICPC notes that a single dragged anchor can damage several cables at once and create a backlog for repair ships (ICPC). Its examples include a 2002 case in which a container ship cut three transatlantic cables after its anchor windlass was secured only by the brake, without the chain stopper (ICPC), a failure mode close to what the Helsinki District Court found in the Eagle S case (Helsinki District Court, Oct. 3, 2025).

The Pacific has already had its own test, from nature rather than a ship. The World Bank’s rapid damage assessment for the Jan. 15, 2022 Hunga Tonga-Hunga Haʻapai eruption reports that telephone and internet lines were cut at 6:40 p.m. when the 827 km fibre cable linking Tonga to Fiji was damaged, isolating Tonga’s telecommunications from the rest of the world. The same cable had been damaged in 2019 by a ship’s anchor. Satellite phones were scarce and costly, and repair was expected to take more than four weeks (World Bank GRADE report). By Feb. 22, 2022 the international section was repaired and about 90 percent of data, SMS and voice service on Tongatapu was restored, but Tonga Cable Limited said repairs to the damaged domestic cable could take up to six to nine months (Emergency Telecommunications Cluster, Feb. 2022).

Tonga’s experience shows the core difference with the Baltic. When Estlink 2 and four telecom cables failed on one day, Finland’s regulator could say that traffic moved to backups and that the internet did not depend on any single cable (Traficom, Dec. 28, 2024). Estonia said in 2023 that it had nine connections, seven undersea and two overland, to keep services running (Government of Estonia, Oct. 20, 2023). A small island state with one international cable has no such fallback. Hawaiʻi and Guam are better connected, but they too rely on a limited number of cable landings and repair ships, which is why ISPI’s analysis of Honolulu Harbor and the single-port state and work on supply chain singularity in island communities keep returning to single points of failure.

What are Pacific governments and partners already doing?

Connectivity has improved. In December 2021, Australia, Japan and the United States committed to fund a cable linking Kosrae in the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru and Tarawa in Kiribati to the existing HANTRU-1 cable at Pohnpei, serving about 100,000 people, building on earlier trilateral support for Palau’s cable (joint statement, Dec. 11, 2021). On Sept. 1, 2026, Australia announced that the 2,250 km East Micronesia Cable was complete, that it had contributed about AUD 65 million of the AUD 135 million cost, and that all Pacific Islands Forum members were now connected to undersea telecommunications infrastructure for the first time (Australian Foreign Minister, Sept. 1, 2026). ISPI’s Pacific Islands Forum explainer covers the regional body those members belong to.

Pacific states have also signed on to the security agenda. The New York Joint Statement on the Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables, issued on Sept. 26, 2024 during the UN General Assembly, was endorsed by the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, Tonga and Tuvalu along with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the United States, the EU and others. It commits endorsers to design cables with resilience, redundancy and security in mind, to choose secure and verifiable suppliers, to enhance route diversity, and to anticipate risks of intentional or unintentional damage (New York joint statement, Sept. 26, 2024).

For Hawaiʻi and the U.S. territories, the main federal lever is the Federal Communications Commission’s cable landing licence. On Aug. 7, 2025 the FCC adopted rules that presume denial for certain applicants controlled by foreign adversaries, limit capacity leases to such entities, ban covered equipment and add cybersecurity and physical security requirements; it reported 90 FCC-licensed cable systems (FCC, Aug. 7, 2025). The rules, published in the Federal Register on Oct. 27, 2025, took effect on Nov. 26, 2025, except for several sections whose effective date was indefinitely delayed. They confirm that cables linking Hawaiʻi or a territory to other U.S. points need a licence when laid beyond the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea, and the FCC cited Guam’s military bases in rejecting the claim that purely domestic cables raise no security concerns (Federal Register, Oct. 27, 2025). Port facility operators covered by the Coast Guard’s new cyber rule face a parallel set of obligations, described in ISPI’s explainer on the Coast Guard maritime cybersecurity rule.

What should Pacific island governments learn from the Baltic?

ISPI draws five lessons from the record above. They are ISPI’s analysis, built on the cited facts, not the stated policy of any government.

1. Redundancy did more than warships

On the day of the worst Baltic incident, the decisive protection was not a patrol but a backup route: Finnish traffic switched to other cables and service continued (Traficom, Dec. 28, 2024). Cinia, after its own outage, said redundancy remains essential and that new alternative connections are critical as needs grow (Cinia). For Pacific governments, a second cable, a domestic ring or a contracted and tested satellite fallback buys more resilience than any feasible patrol. The Abuja Declaration makes the same point in general terms: diversify routes and landings so no region is left isolated (Abuja Declaration, Feb. 26, 2025).

2. Repair time is the real exposure

The Baltic shows a wide range: about ten days for C-Lion1, with a repair ship sent from France (Cinia), and nearly six months for the Estlink 2 power cable (Fingrid, June 18, 2025). Tonga waited more than five weeks for its international link and faced months for domestic cables (World Bank GRADE report; Emergency Telecommunications Cluster, Feb. 2022). Island governments can shorten that gap with steps the advisory body recommends: one government contact point for repair permits, pre-cleared customs and crew procedures for repair ships, and shared spares and vessels (advisory body Working Group 1).

3. Law that only flag states can enforce is fragile

Article 113 depends on flag states criminalizing cable damage and prosecuting their ships and nationals (UNCLOS). The Eagle S was flagged in the Cook Islands (Helsinki Court of Appeal, Aug. 27, 2026), so a Pacific registry sat at the centre of a European dispute. Pacific states that run ship registries, and every state with cables, can review whether their law actually makes wilful and culpably negligent damage an offence, as the Baltic allies urged (Baltic Sea NATO Allies Summit statement), and whether their registry could investigate a ship hundreds or thousands of miles away.

4. Plan for uncertainty about cause

In none of the Baltic cases did investigators announce a confirmed deliberate attack within days, and positions still differ years later (Government of Estonia, Oct. 20, 2023; China MFA, Aug. 13, 2024; Helsinki District Court, Oct. 3, 2025; Helsinki Court of Appeal, Aug. 27, 2026). Emergency managers cannot wait for attribution. Continuity plans should treat a cable outage the same way whether it comes from an anchor, a volcano or sabotage: who can still communicate, how payments and health services keep running, and how the public is informed. ISPI’s continuity of operations guide for island local governments provides a template.

5. Monitoring can be shared

Baltic Sentry depends on frigates, patrol aircraft, drones and national surveillance assets (NATO, Jan. 14, 2025). Most Pacific island states have no navy. What they can draw on is shared data, regional cooperation and partners, the approach the EU calls sea-basin monitoring (European Commission, Feb. 21, 2025) and that the Baltic allies pursued through vessel surveillance and insurance checks (Baltic Sea NATO Allies Summit statement). Knowing which ships anchor or loiter near cable landings is within reach of port and maritime authorities that already track traffic for security and safety, as ISPI’s guide to the maritime chokepoints island economies depend on and Red Sea shipping analysis discuss for shipping.

What this means for Hawaiʻi and the U.S. Pacific

Hawaiʻi’s cable questions are both trans-Pacific and interisland, as ISPI’s explainer on Pacific undersea cables and why islands are exposed explains. That makes the federal licensing regime (Federal Register, Oct. 27, 2025) and port facility security rules (explainer on the Coast Guard maritime cybersecurity rule) more than paperwork. State and county emergency managers should know where cables land, which agencies and companies hold the repair and restoration roles, and how long a loss of one landing would last. ISPI’s HI-06 paper on Hawaiʻi’s infrastructure deficit and WP-06 working paper on supply chain security discuss how infrastructure gaps and supply chain dependence interact on islands.

For Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands and the Compact states, the issue is closer to Tonga’s: fewer cables, longer repair voyages and limited fallback. The East Micronesia Cable reduces that exposure for Kosrae, Nauru and Tarawa (Australian Foreign Minister, Sept. 1, 2026), and the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands, which endorsed the 2024 New York statement, have already committed to redundancy and route diversity in principle (New York joint statement, Sept. 26, 2024). The next step is turning those commitments into tested outage plans. ISPI’s island security agreements tracker follows the agreements under which partners support Pacific security, including infrastructure.

What this means for island and coastal governments

The Baltic incidents show that wealthy states with navies and multiple cables still spent months establishing what happened and years working out who could be prosecuted. Island governments with one or two cables cannot rely on deterrence alone. The practical agenda is the one the ITU–ICPC advisory body and the Baltic record point to: more routes, faster repair, clear flag-state law, shared monitoring and continuity plans that assume the cable will be down for weeks. ISPI’s supply chain and critical infrastructure research hub and ports and maritime security hub collect related work on the infrastructure and maritime side.

The most useful next steps are simple to state. Map which services fail if the international cable fails. Name the government contact point for repair permits and test it. Review national law against UNCLOS Article 113. Agree with operators how long they expect a repair to take and what fallback capacity exists. Run a tabletop exercise on a two-week outage.

Frequently asked questions

Were the Baltic Sea cable cuts sabotage?

There is no single official answer. Estonia called the December 2024 Estlink 2 damage sabotage, and Finland and Germany said the November 2024 C-Lion1 break raised suspicions of intentional damage. Finnish prosecutors charged the Eagle S officers without alleging that they intended to damage the cables, and China said its own Balticconnector investigation was ongoing. ISPI reports each position and does not draw its own conclusion.

What is NATO’s Baltic Sentry?

Baltic Sentry is a NATO enhanced vigilance activity launched on Jan. 14, 2025 at a summit in Helsinki. It adds frigates, maritime patrol aircraft and a small fleet of naval drones in the Baltic Sea, integrates national surveillance assets, and works with industry through NATO’s Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network to protect undersea cables and pipelines.

What happened in the Eagle S court case?

The Helsinki District Court dismissed the charges on Oct. 3, 2025, finding the anchor loss was an incident of navigation under the Law of the Sea, so jurisdiction lay with the flag state or the officers’ home states. On Aug. 27, 2026 the Helsinki Court of Appeal reversed that ruling, held that Finland has jurisdiction, and sent the case back for trial. The appeal ruling was not final.

What does international law say about damaging undersea cables?

Article 113 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea requires every state to make it a punishable offence for its ships or nationals to break or injure a submarine cable beneath the high seas wilfully or through culpable negligence. Article 58 applies this rule in exclusive economic zones. Article 97 limits who can prosecute crews for incidents of navigation.

Could a Pacific island lose its internet the way the Baltic cables failed?

Yes, and Tonga already has. The Jan. 15, 2022 eruption cut Tonga’s only international cable, isolating the country until the link was repaired more than five weeks later; the same cable had been damaged by a ship’s anchor in 2019. The difference from Finland is redundancy: Finnish traffic was immediately routed to backup connections.

What can island governments do to protect undersea cables?

Add a second route or tested satellite fallback, name one government contact for repair permits, pre-clear customs and crew procedures for repair ships, check national law against UNCLOS Article 113, share vessel-tracking data near landings with partners, and run continuity exercises that assume a multi-week outage.

ISPI publishes its research free under CC BY 4.0. If your island government, regulator, port authority or utility needs a cable outage continuity review, a tabletop exercise on a multi-week loss of connectivity or a review of national law against UNCLOS Article 113, you can commission research from ISPI. ISPI is a nonprofit organization with its 501(c)(3) application pending.

Sources

1. NATO, NATO launches Baltic Sentry to increase critical infrastructure security (news release, Jan. 14, 2025)
2. Office of the President of the Republic of Finland, Joint statement of the Baltic Sea NATO Allies Summit (Helsinki, Jan. 14, 2025)
3. Helsinki District Court, District Court judgment in the criminal case involving the tanker EAGLE S, notice R 706/2025/12270 (Oct. 3, 2025) (PDF)
4. Helsinki Court of Appeal, Release on the Court of Appeal decision in the Eagle S case, R 16/2025/2572 (Aug. 27, 2026) (in Finnish)
5. Traficom (Finnish Transport and Communications Agency), Traficom and other authorities investigate cable damage in the Gulf of Finland (Dec. 28, 2024)
6. Fingrid, EstLink 2 electricity transmission link returns to commercial use (June 18, 2025)
7. Estonian Ministry of Defence, The Minister of Defence and the Commander of the Defence Forces agreed on a naval operation to protect Estlink 1 (Dec. 27, 2024)
8. Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister Tsahkna: Threat to our infrastructure will get a response (Dec. 27, 2024)
9. Government of Estonia, Prime Minister Kallas convened ministers and relevant authorities to discuss the situation regarding Balticconnector and undersea cable (Oct. 10, 2023)
10. Government of Estonia, Government given overview of investigation into undersea cables (Oct. 20, 2023)
11. Gasgrid Finland, Balticconnector in commercial use from Monday 22 April onwards (2024)
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13. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Regular press conference of Oct. 25, 2023
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19. ITU, Launch of international advisory body to support resilience of submarine telecom cables (press release, Nov. 29, 2024)
20. ITU, International Advisory Body for Submarine Cable Resilience, members page
21. International Advisory Body on Submarine Cable Resilience, Abuja Declaration (Feb. 26, 2025) (PDF)
22. International Advisory Body on Submarine Cable Resilience, Working Group 1 Recommendations: Timely Deployment and Repair (PDF)
23. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, official text (articles 58, 79, 97 and 113–115) (PDF)
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25. World Bank, The January 15, 2022 Hunga Tonga-Hunga Ha’apai Eruption and Tsunami, Tonga: GRADE Report (valid as of Feb. 7, 2022) (PDF)
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27. U.S. Department of State (archived), Joint Statement on Improving East Micronesia Telecommunications Connectivity (Dec. 11, 2021)
28. Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Landmark six-nation partnership delivers East Micronesia Cable (Sept. 1, 2026)
29. U.S. Department of State (archived), Joint Statement on the Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables in a Globally Digitalized World (Sept. 26, 2024)
30. Federal Communications Commission, FCC Acts to Accelerate Submarine Cable Buildout & Security (news release, Aug. 7, 2025)
31. Federal Register, FCC final rule on submarine cable landing licenses, FR Doc. 2025-19658 (Oct. 27, 2025)