About 98 percent of Hawaii's imported goods arrive through its commercial harbors (HDOT), and in the Lahaina fire, water pressure and cellular service both failed (Attorney General's FSRI reports). In ISPI's analysis, port, water, and communications resilience belong at the center of emergency planning.
Abstract
Examines how ports, water systems, and communications shape emergency resilience in Hawaii, drawing on state harbor data and the Lahaina fire reports, and recommends planning priorities. All ISPI research is free under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.
Key Findings
About 80 percent of goods consumed in Hawaii are imported, and about 98 percent of those arrive through the commercial harbors (HDOT Harbors 2015)
During the Lahaina fire, hydrant pressure and flow fell as pipes in burning buildings failed (FSRI 2024; FSRI 2025)
Cellular service in the Lahaina area was lost on August 8, 2023, and responders relied on radio (FSRI 2024; WFCA 2024)
Summary of the paper
"Hawaii's Infrastructure and Island Emergency Resilience" examines how ports, water systems, and communications shape emergency resilience in Hawaii.
It draws on state harbor data and the Lahaina fire reports prepared for the Hawaii Attorney General and the Maui Fire Department. It notes the 2026 RISE bonds ballot question without taking a position.
What the paper finds
- Ports. About 80 percent of goods consumed in Hawaii are imported, and about 98 percent of those arrive through the commercial harbors.
- Water. In Lahaina, demand exceeded what the water system could deliver at adequate pressure as buildings burned and pipes failed.
- Communications. Cellular service in the Lahaina area was lost on August 8, 2023; responders relied on radio.
What it recommends
- Prioritize harbor hardening and recovery planning.
- Plan firefighting water supply for wildfire and power loss.
- Review the redundancy of emergency alerting.
- Assess dependencies among ports, power, water, and communications.
Who it's for
State and county emergency managers, water utilities, harbor officials, and legislators.
Many Pacific island states also depend on a single main port and limited utility networks, so the same planning questions apply, in ISPI's analysis.
Cite as
Pulley, Warren (2026). Hawaii's Infrastructure and Island Emergency Resilience: Ports, Water, and Communications in an Island Emergency (ISPI HI-06). Island Security Policy Institute, Honolulu. https://ispiglobal.com/papers-landing/hi06-infrastructure-deficit https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23449772
BibTeX
@techreport{ispihi062026,
author = {Pulley, Warren},
title = {Hawaii's Infrastructure and Island Emergency Resilience: Ports, Water, and Communications in an Island Emergency},
institution = {Island Security Policy Institute},
address = {Honolulu, HI},
number = {ISPI HI-06},
year = {2026},
url = {https://ispiglobal.com/papers-landing/hi06-infrastructure-deficit},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23449772}
}Related Research
WP-06 — Supply Chain Security →WP-03 — Emergency Management Framework →HI-04 — Maui Recovery →Related analysis
AnalysisSupply Chain Singularity — The Island Security Vulnerability No Continental Framework Addresses →AnalysisHawaii Grid Vulnerability After Hurricane Lala: The Infrastructure Gap Behind the Power Outages →AnalysisHow to Conduct an Insular Vulnerability Audit: A Step-by-Step Guide for Island Organizations →PaperHI-05 — Federal Funding Uncertainty and Island Resilience in Hawaii →PaperHI-07 — Native Hawaiian Rights and DHHL Policy: Public Safety Implications →RegionHawaii Public Safety Research →GuideIsland Emergency Management & Preparedness: Research and FAQ →GuideIsland Supply Chain Security & Community Resilience: Research and FAQ →Pulley, Warren. "Infrastructure Deficit and Island Resilience in Hawaii." Island Security Policy Institute, 2026. https://ispiglobal.com/papers-landing/hi06-infrastructure-deficit
