Red Hill and Island Water Security: What Happened, What Changed and What Islands Can Learn
The Navy's Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility on Oahu holds 20 underground tanks that sit about 100 to 130 feet above groundwater used for drinking water. In November 2021, jet fuel from a May 2021 release reached the Navy's Red Hill drinking water shaft and affected about 93,000 water users. The tanks were defueled by March 2024, EPA says the affected systems have been free of fuel contamination since 2022, and closure and aquifer cleanup are still under way. For islands, the lesson is that a single shared aquifer turns one facility failure into an island-wide water question.
What is the Red Hill facility?
The Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility supports U.S. military operations in the Pacific and was designed to store up to 250 million gallons of fuel, according to the EPA. It has 20 steel-lined tanks, each about 12.5 million gallons, built into cavities mined inside Red Hill near Pearl Harbor. Each tank is 100 feet across and 250 feet tall, the cavities sit under about 100 feet of rock, and three pipelines run 2.5 miles through a tunnel to fueling piers at Pearl Harbor (EPA).
The facility's location is the heart of the issue. The GAO-25-106572 report describes Red Hill as a significant fuel reserve for ships and aircraft in the Indo-Pacific, and says the tanks sit about 100 to 130 feet above groundwater that serves several public water systems, largely those supporting Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam and the greater Honolulu area. That groundwater also feeds civilian wells run by the Honolulu Board of Water Supply (BWS), which is why a problem inside a military fuel tunnel became a question for the whole of urban Honolulu.
What happened in 2021?
On May 6, 2021, a pressure surge during routine fuel movement caused a pipeline joint failure that released more than 19,000 gallons of JP-5 jet fuel onto the tunnel floor. Fuel flowed into a fire suppression drain line and stayed there until that line ruptured on Nov. 20, 2021, spilling fuel into the tunnel system near the Red Hill drinking water shaft (EPA).
Families living on Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam and the Army's Aliamanu Military Reservation and Red Hill Housing reported petroleum odors in their tap water, and residents reported health symptoms. EPA says about 93,000 Navy water system users were affected, and many relocated to temporary housing (EPA). The GAO-25-106572 report adds that up to 5,500 gallons of fuel was not recovered from the release and that a Navy investigation found human error was a primary cause of both 2021 incidents.
Red Hill had a history before 2021. In January 2014, while refilling Tank 5 after maintenance, the Navy identified a release of up to 27,000 gallons of JP-8 jet fuel. That event led to the 2015 Administrative Order on Consent that governed the facility for years afterward (EPA). And in November 2022, after the closure decision, about 1,300 gallons of firefighting foam concentrate were released within the facility and surrounding environment during maintenance, according to a DOD investigation cited by GAO (GAO-25-106572).
How did the water crisis spread beyond the base?
The Navy's water system wasn't the only one at risk. On Dec. 2, 2021, the Honolulu Board of Water Supply completely shut down Halawa Shaft, its largest water source on Oahu, after reports of contamination at the Navy's Red Hill well. Two days earlier BWS had already cut Halawa pumping by half, from 10 million to 5 million gallons per day (Honolulu Board of Water Supply, Dec. 3, 2021).
BWS manager and chief engineer Ernest Lau explained the reason: “We have data that shows when they stop pumping at Red Hill, water starts moving in the direction of our Halawa Shaft due to our pumping.” BWS said it would make up the 20% of supply that Halawa Shaft provided by pumping more from other sources and asked customers to conserve water (Honolulu Board of Water Supply, Dec. 3, 2021).
That's the island dimension in one example. On a continent, a utility can often bring in water from another basin. On Oahu, the civilian utility and the military draw on the same groundwater, so protecting one system meant shutting down a major source in the other.
What did regulators and the Defense Department decide?
| Date | Event | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Jan. 2014 | Up to 27,000 gallons of JP-8 released from Tank 5 | EPA |
| May 6, 2021 | Pipeline joint failure releases more than 19,000 gallons of JP-5 | EPA |
| Nov. 20, 2021 | Drain line ruptures; fuel reaches area near the Red Hill shaft | EPA |
| Dec. 6, 2021 | Hawaii DOH emergency order to cease operations and defuel; reissued May 6, 2022 | EPA |
| March 7, 2022 | Secretary of Defense directs defueling and permanent closure | EPA |
| March 2022 | Unsafe Water Advisory amended to allow unrestricted use | EPA, March 31, 2026 |
| March 2024 | Defueling completed; 104,703,574 gallons removed | U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, March 29, 2024 |
After the contamination, the Hawaii Department of Health (DOH) issued an emergency order on Dec. 6, 2021, requiring the Navy to stop operations and defuel the 18 operational tanks; DOH reissued the order on May 6, 2022 (EPA). On March 7, 2022, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III directed the department to defuel and permanently shut down the facility (EPA).
Joint Task Force-Red Hill completed defueling in March 2024. It reported removing 104,703,574 gallons of fuel, including all accessible residual fuel, roughly six months ahead of the original plan, and handed the site to the Navy Closure Task Force-Red Hill on March 28, 2024 (U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, March 29, 2024). DOH confirmed the defueling obligations were complete, and Deputy Director Kathleen Ho added: “there is still much work to be done to permanently close the Red Hill facility and remediate the environment” (Hawaii DOH, March 28, 2024).
Is the drinking water safe now?
For the affected military systems, EPA's answer is yes. In its final drinking water report, released March 31, 2026, EPA concluded that water from the Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam and Aliamanu Military Reservation systems has been free of fuel contamination and in compliance with federal and state rules since 2022. The assessment included a three-year sampling effort at every accessible residence and priority buildings such as schools, child development centers and medical facilities, and DOH reviewed and supported the conclusions (EPA, March 31, 2026).
Questions about the wider aquifer remain open. In September 2026, DOH gave the Navy conditional approval to reactivate its Aiea Halawa Shaft with a newly installed granular activated carbon and ion exchange treatment system, subject to monitoring conditions (Hawaii DOH letter, Sept. 4, 2026). BWS has questioned the reopening. Lau told KITV that most of the 49 monitoring wells in the area are on Navy property, and BWS continues to ask regulators for more frequent sampling and more monitoring wells (KITV, Oct. 10, 2026; BWS Red Hill update, September 2026). A PFAS remedial investigation work plan for Red Hill includes new monitoring wells and two groundwater sampling events six months apart (BWS Red Hill update, September 2026).
What is left to do?
Closure is a multi-year engineering and regulatory process. The Navy submitted its tank closure plan to EPA and DOH on Nov. 1, 2022, with supplements in 2023, 2024 and 2025, and EPA commented on Supplement 4 in August 2025 (EPA). GAO reported in November 2024 that DOD planned to close the facility, including removing pipelines and ancillary equipment, by June 2028 (GAO-25-106572). EPA oversees the work under a 2023 Administrative Consent Order with the Navy and the Defense Logistics Agency (EPA, March 31, 2026).
Agencies don't agree on every detail of the remaining work, and that's normal for a cleanup of this size. What the public record shows is a shift from emergency response to long-term oversight: closure plans, groundwater monitoring and community advisory meetings that continue in 2026.
What does Red Hill teach island communities about water security?
Water is one of the sectors the federal government treats as critical infrastructure. CISA notes that more than 80 percent of the U.S. population gets drinking water from public systems, and that the sector is vulnerable to physical attacks, cyberattacks and contamination. Red Hill shows a quieter risk: legacy infrastructure, owned by one agency, sitting above a resource that many others depend on. In ISPI's analysis, four lessons travel to other islands:
- Map shared dependencies. Know which aquifers, wells and pipelines serve both military and civilian users, and who has to be notified when one goes offline.
- Plan for losing a major source. BWS replaced a source that provided 20% of supply by pumping more elsewhere. Smaller islands may not have that spare capacity, so plans should name alternate sources and conservation triggers in advance.
- Make notification fast and shared. BWS publicly said it wasn't notified immediately when the Navy shut down its well. Joint notification protocols between federal, state and county water operators are a low-cost fix.
- Treat closure as a continuity project. Defueling took about two years and closure is planned to run years longer. Emergency and continuity plans should cover that whole period, not only the first weeks.
ISPI's HI-06: Infrastructure Deficit and Island Resilience in Hawaii looks at how ports, water systems and communications shape emergency resilience in Hawaii, and HI-08: Climate Resilience and Emergency Response in Hawaii covers compound scenarios where water and other systems fail together. For planning frameworks, see WP-03: Island Emergency Management and PB-10: Continuity of Operations Planning for Island Government Agencies. Related analysis: Hawaii grid vulnerability after Hurricane Lala and Pacific undersea cables explained.
Frequently asked questions
How many people were affected by the 2021 Red Hill fuel release?
About 93,000 users of the Navy's water system, according to EPA (EPA; EPA, March 31, 2026).
Has the Red Hill facility been emptied?
Yes. Joint Task Force-Red Hill removed 104,703,574 gallons of fuel and completed defueling in March 2024 (U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, March 29, 2024).
Is the affected Navy drinking water safe?
EPA concluded in March 2026 that the affected military water systems have been free of fuel contamination and in compliance with federal and state rules since 2022 (EPA, March 31, 2026).
When will Red Hill be fully closed?
GAO reported in 2024 that DOD planned to complete closure, including removing pipelines and ancillary equipment, by June 2028 (GAO-25-106572).
Sources
- U.S. EPA, “About the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility”
- U.S. EPA, “About the Fuel Releases at the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility”
- U.S. EPA, “Closure of the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility”
- U.S. EPA, “Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility Closure Plan”
- U.S. EPA, “EPA Concludes Drinking Water Has Been Free of Fuel Contamination Since 2022, in Wake of Red Hill Release,” news release, March 31, 2026
- U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “Joint Task Force-Red Hill Completes Defueling Mission; Closure and Environmental Remediation Now Main DoD Effort,” March 29, 2024
- Hawaii Department of Health, “As JTF-Red Hill completes operations, DOH looks ahead to overseeing permanent closure of Red Hill facility and aquifer remediation,” March 28, 2024
- Hawaii Department of Health, Safe Drinking Water Branch, “Conditional Approval to Reactivate the Navy Aiea Halawa Shaft,” letter, Sept. 4, 2026
- Honolulu Board of Water Supply, “BWS Shuts Down Halawa Shaft in Response to Red Hill Contamination,” Dec. 3, 2021
- Honolulu Board of Water Supply, “Red Hill Updates,” board meeting material, September 2026
- Angela Cifone, “Navy well near Red Hill gets conditional reopening approval amid ongoing contamination concerns,” KITV, Oct. 10, 2026
- U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Red Hill Fuel Storage: DOD’s Contract Approaches and Oversight before and after the 2021 Fuel Leaks,” GAO-25-106572, Nov. 4, 2024
- Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, “Water and Wastewater Systems Sector”
- ISPI papers: HI-06, HI-08, WP-03, PB-10
