Basing and Status-of-Forces Agreements in the Pacific, Explained

What a status-of-forces agreement is

There is no required form, length or title for a SOFA. The most common issue it settles is which country may exercise criminal jurisdiction over visiting personnel; other provisions can cover uniforms, taxes and fees, carrying weapons, radio frequencies, licences and customs. Some agreements give the sending state exclusive jurisdiction, but more often jurisdiction is shared. SOFAs are peacetime documents, and the United States alone is party to more than 100 agreements that may be considered SOFAs (CRS RL34531).

Headlines often call any defence agreement a “base deal.” In practice there are three layers:

• Status (the SOFA layer): what law applies to visiting personnel and who prosecutes them.
• Access: which ports, airfields and facilities visiting forces may use, build on or store equipment at, usually set in a defence cooperation agreement or treaty annex.
• Commitment and denial: whether one country promises to defend the other, and whether third countries are kept out.

The table lists the main instruments with public texts or official summaries as of late October 2026. It is not exhaustive.

United States and Papua New Guinea: the 2023 Defense Cooperation Agreement

The U.S.–PNG Defense Cooperation Agreement was signed in Port Moresby on May 22, 2023 and entered into force on August 16, 2023 (State Dept.). On entry into force it superseded the 1989 U.S.–PNG Status of Forces Agreement and a 1990 memorandum on joint military activities (DCA text). It puts all three layers in one public document.

Status. PNG agreed that U.S. authorities have the exclusive right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel, and civil jurisdiction for acts the U.S. determines occurred in the course of official duty. PNG keeps civil jurisdiction for off-duty acts, must notify U.S. authorities of any arrest, and must promptly transfer arrested U.S. personnel to U.S. custody (DCA text, Article 3).Access. Annex A lists six agreed facilities and areas: Nadzab Airport (Lae), Lae Seaport, Lombrum Naval Base, Momote Airport, Port Moresby’s Jacksons International Airport and Port Moresby Seaport. PNG provides “unimpeded access” to them without rental costs, for activities including training, refuelling, aircraft that may conduct intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, staging of forces and prepositioning of materiel. Buildings U.S. forces construct become PNG property (DCA text, Articles 5–7).Other terms. U.S. vessels and aircraft are free from boarding and inspection without U.S. consent; disputes go to the two governments and may not be referred to any national or international court; and the agreement runs for an initial 15 years, then continues unless either side gives one year’s notice (DCA text, Articles 10, 21 and 22).

Australia and Papua New Guinea: the Pukpuk Treaty

Australia and PNG signed the Papua New Guinea–Australia Mutual Defence Treaty, known as the Pukpuk Treaty, in Canberra on October 6, 2025 (PM of Australia). It entered into force on July 8, 2026 (Australian DFAT). Australia described it as its first new alliance in more than 70 years and PNG’s first with any country (PM of Australia).

Each party recognises that an armed attack on either of them within the Pacific would be dangerous to the other’s peace and security, and declares it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes (treaty text, Article 4). On status, the treaty builds on a 1977 Australia–PNG Status of Forces Agreement and gives Australian authorities the exclusive right to exercise criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction over Australian defence personnel conducting cooperation activities in PNG (treaty text, Articles 6 and 8).

On access, PNG is to provide unimpeded access to agreed facilities and areas, which are listed in a separate implementing arrangement that must be reviewed at least every three years (treaty text, Article 7). The denial provisions are the newest element. PNG may not, without Australia’s consent, let any third state or entity access, use or improve an agreed facility; and the parties must mutually determine outside involvement in PNG’s critical infrastructure that could compromise the treaty (treaty text, Annex C, Articles 1 and 4). Both parties also agree not to put in place arrangements with third parties that would compromise their ability to implement it (treaty text, Article 5).

PNG now holds access agreements with both the United States and Australia; ISPI’s Papua New Guinea hub collects related research.

Fiji: reciprocal SOFAs and a treaty that names third-party bases

Fiji’s approach has been reciprocal status agreements rather than access agreements. Australia and Fiji signed their Defence Cooperation and Status of Visiting Forces Agreement in Suva on October 20, 2022; it covers immigration and customs, wearing uniforms, and criminal and civil jurisdiction, and the same obligations apply to both parties (Defence Ministers; text). It entered into force for Australia on May 20, 2026 (entry-into-force notice). New Zealand and Fiji signed a SOFA in Suva in June 2023 that provides a legal framework for the presence of each country’s forces in the other’s territory (RNZ; NZ Ministry of Defence).

With the United States, Fiji signed an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement on logistics on November 23, 2024, and the two governments began formal SOFA negotiations (DOD News). Then-Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said a SOFA would let the U.S. deploy and redeploy forces in support of Fiji and train with Fijian forces routinely, and that there was “no notion” of permanent bases in Fiji (briefing transcript). A Fiji foreign ministry readout dated September 25, 2026 lists the SOFA among issues the two governments discussed (Fiji MFA). ISPI found no public announcement that it has been signed.

The Fiji–Australia Vuvale Union treaty, signed in Suva on July 6, 2026, goes further on denial in its wording. The parties “recognise the following could threaten or undermine” their own or the region’s security: “a third party military or other security base, ongoing presence, arrangements or visits,” and they commit to engage third parties in critical infrastructure and security sectors in a way that protects collective security (Vuvale Union text, Article 4). ISPI’s Fiji hub tracks related work.

The Compact states and Guam

The Compacts of Free Association are the oldest basing framework in the region. Under Title Three, the United States has “full authority and responsibility for security and defense matters” in the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands, including the obligation to defend them, “the option to foreclose access to or use of” their territory by third-country militaries, and the option to establish military areas and facilities under separate agreements (Compact, Title Three, Section 311). The U.S. authority cannot be transferred (Compact, Title Three, Section 316).

The Congressional Research Service summarises these as the U.S. “defense veto” and “right of strategic denial,” and notes that the U.S. military operates the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Test Site on Kwajalein Atoll and is building a high-frequency radar system in Palau (CRS R48311). ISPI’s Compacts of Free Association explainer covers the migration and funding side, and the Compact States hub gathers related research.

SOFAs govern forces in foreign countries (CRS RL34531); Guam is a U.S. territory, so the question there is scale. In December 2024 about 100 logistics Marines began relocating from Okinawa to Guam, the first phase of moving Marines out of Japan; Japan has funded relocation construction with cash contributions of up to US$2.8 billion in fiscal 2008 dollars, and Marine Corps Base Camp Blaz is to be the main installation (USMC–Japan MOD statement). ISPI’s PB-03: Public Safety Policy in U.S. Pacific Territories and the Guam and CNMI research hub cover the public safety policy gaps that territories face under federal frameworks.

Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Solomon Islands: denial without basing

Not every security treaty grants bases. The Australia–Tuvalu Falepili Union, in force since August 28, 2024, obliges Australia to respond to Tuvalu’s requests for help after a major natural disaster, a public health emergency or military aggression (PM of Australia). Tuvalu “shall mutually agree with Australia any partnership, arrangement or engagement with any other State or entity on security and defence-related matters,” which the treaty says include policing, ports, telecommunications and energy (Falepili text, Article 4). ISPI’s Tuvalu national security policy analysis looks at Tuvalu developing its first national security policy alongside those commitments.

Australia’s Nakamal Agreement with Vanuatu is discussed in ISPI’s analysis of the Australia–Vanuatu Nakamal Agreement. The 2022 Solomon Islands–China framework agreement is the region’s main example of an agreement whose access terms are not public: a leaked March 2022 draft said China may “make ship visits, to carry out logistical replenishment in, and have stopover and transition in Solomon Islands” (ABC News), and the final text has never been released. Our Solomon Islands–China security agreement timeline tracks that agreement through 2026.

What island governments and communities can check

Read side by side, the public texts suggest five practical checks for any SOFA or access agreement, whichever partner is involved:

• Jurisdiction: who prosecutes a visiting service member for an off-duty offence, and what the host is told about the outcome. Both PNG agreements give the sending state exclusive criminal jurisdiction (DCA text; treaty text).
• Dispute settlement: the U.S.–PNG agreement, the Pukpuk Treaty and the Falepili Union each say disputes will not go to any national or international court (DCA text; treaty text; Falepili text). Oversight therefore rests with the joint committees and ministerial meetings they create.
• Costs and land: who pays for facilities, utilities and construction, and who owns improvements when visiting forces leave (DCA text, Articles 5 and 7).
• Environment and public health: what the text says about environmental law and hazardous materials; the U.S.–PNG agreement states an intent to respect PNG environmental, health and safety laws (DCA text, Article 18).
• Interaction with other agreements: whether a third-party or critical-infrastructure clause in one treaty limits options under another, as in the Pukpuk Treaty, the Falepili Union and the Vuvale Union (treaty text; Falepili text; Vuvale Union text).

These questions connect to ISPI’s wider research. WP-10: Democratic Resilience in the Pacific and PB-18: Small States, Large Pressures look at why institutional technical capacity underpins democratic resilience in Pacific Island nations facing outside pressure, and CM-14: China and Pacific Security looks at the community-level public safety implications of China’s expanding security agreements with Pacific Island nations. The region’s own frame for these choices is the expanded concept of security in the Boe Declaration (see our Boe Declaration explainer), and our RIMPAC 2026 commentary looks at how large exercises interact with island infrastructure.

Frequently asked questions

What is a status-of-forces agreement?

An agreement that sets the legal status of one country’s military personnel while they are in another country. The most common issue it settles is criminal jurisdiction; it can also cover entry and exit, uniforms, weapons, taxes, customs and licences.

Is a SOFA the same as a military base agreement?

No. A SOFA sets the rules for personnel; it is not a mutual defence agreement and generally does not authorize specific missions. Access to bases and facilities is usually set in a separate defence cooperation agreement or treaty, which may include SOFA-style terms.

Which facilities can U.S. forces use in Papua New Guinea?

The 2023 U.S.–PNG Defense Cooperation Agreement lists six: Nadzab Airport (Lae), Lae Seaport, Lombrum Naval Base, Momote Airport, Port Moresby Jacksons International Airport and Port Moresby Seaport. The list can be amended in writing.

What is the Pukpuk Treaty?

The Papua New Guinea–Australia Mutual Defence Treaty, signed October 6, 2025 and in force since July 8, 2026. It contains a mutual defence obligation, provides Australian access to agreed facilities in PNG, and requires Australia’s consent before any third party uses those facilities.

Does Fiji have a SOFA with the United States?

ISPI found no announcement of one as of late October 2026. Negotiations began in November 2024 and were still under discussion in September 2026. Fiji has reciprocal SOFAs with Australia and New Zealand.

ISPI publishes its research free under CC BY 4.0. If your government, agency or organization needs a briefing on defence cooperation agreements, status-of-forces terms, or regional security architecture, you can commission research from ISPI. ISPI is a nonprofit organization; its application for 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status is pending. Contributions are not tax-deductible until IRS recognition is granted.

Sources

1. Congressional Research Service, “Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA): What Is It, and How Has It Been Utilized?” RL34531, March 15, 2012
2. Congressional Research Service, “The Freely Associated States and Issues for Congress,” R48311, December 10, 2024
3. Compact of Free Association (U.S.–FSM–RMI), Title Three, Article I, Sections 311–316 (FSM Legal Information System)
4. Agreement on Defense Cooperation between the United States and Papua New Guinea, TIAS 23-816 (PDF)
5. U.S. Department of State, Office of Treaty Affairs, “Papua New Guinea (23-816) – Defense Cooperation Agreement”
6. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Papua New Guinea–Australia Mutual Defence Treaty (Pukpuk Treaty), full text
7. Prime Minister of Australia, “Australia and Papua New Guinea sign Mutual Defence Treaty,” October 6, 2025
8. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Papua New Guinea country page (Pukpuk Treaty entry into force)
9. Australian Defence Ministers, “Status of Forces Agreement between Fiji and Australia,” October 20, 2022
10. Agreement between Australia and Fiji on Cooperation in the Field of Defence and the Status of Visiting Forces, [2024] ATNIF 7 (AustLII)
11. Home Affairs (Status of Forces Agreement—Fiji—Entry into Force) Notice 2026, Federal Register of Legislation
12. RNZ, “New Zealand and Fiji armed forces lock in defence deal,” June 15, 2023
13. New Zealand Ministry of Defence, “Status of Forces Agreement between Aotearoa New Zealand and the Republic of Fiji: Approval for Signature”
14. DOD News, “Austin Bolsters U.S. Cooperation With Fiji,” November 23, 2024
15. U.S. Department of Defense, transcript of Secretary Austin’s press briefing in Fiji, November 23, 2024
16. Fiji Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade, “UNGA81 | Fiji and U.S. Reaffirm Relations,” September 25, 2026
17. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Fiji–Australia Vuvale Union, treaty text (signed July 6, 2026)
18. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia–Tuvalu Falepili Union, treaty text
19. Prime Minister of Australia, “Entry into force of historic Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union,” August 28, 2024
20. U.S. Marine Corps, “USMC/MOD Joint Statement – Commencement of Force Flow,” December 14, 2024
21. ABC News, “Leaked documents suggest plans for Chinese military presence in Solomon Islands,” March 24, 2022